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CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
RE: Lewis Duncan/ et ah v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company/ et al. 
Case No. 900233-Citation of Supplemental Authority 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
In accordance with Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, please find enclosed an original and nine copies of 
the case of Robert E. Hatfield v. Burlington Northern Railroad 
Company decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 6, 
1992. The decision/ which is to be published, reverses the 
decision of the Federal District Court of Kansas decided in 1991, 
found at 757 F. Supp. 1198, cited and relied upon by appellants 
in their supplemental submission to the Court dated May 23, 1991. 
Since the decision is to be published, I though it appropriate to 
provide copies now rather than wait for the published citation, 
particularly in view of the fact that briefing and oral argument 
in this case were completed some time ago. I apologize for the 
poorly copied first page which was in that condition when I 
received it. 
The case is being brought to the Court's attention for 
the reasons that it is a decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals directly in point on the issue of public agency preemp-
tion of the railroad's common law duty to install warning devices 
at public railroad crossings. The case is in point with the 
arguments set forth under Point I. of Union Pacific's Brief on 
Appeal. 
JCW/rr 
Enclosures 
cc: Allan L. Larson, Esq. 
Craig L. Barlow, Esq. 
Anne Swensen, Esq. 
Stephen J. Sorensen, Esq. 
Michael A. Katz, Esq. 
LLIAMS 
PUBLISH 
UHXTSD STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
^^fa*^ 
WAR 0 61992 
ROBERT LHOECKER 
Clerk 
ROBERT B. HATPI8LD, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 91-3158 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of xonsae 
D,C. No. 8&-1529-K 
Phillip R. Fields, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 
Timothy J. Xing (Terry 8. Stephens, with hi» on the briefs) of 
Stinson, Laasweli f Wilson, Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-
Appellee. 
Before NCXAT and MOORB, Circuit Judges, and AL&BY, District 
Judge.* 
JCOORB, Circuit Judge. 
•The Honorable Wayne B. Alley, United States District Court Judge 
for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 
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intent in FRSA % 434 to preempt the subject of adequate crossing 
warnings once the Secretary of Transportation has acted upon this 
subject/ but found no such action had occurred. Despite 
Burlington'B argument that the Secretary took that action by 
adopting the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices on Streets 
and Highways (MUTCD), the court held that preemption does not 
oocur until a formal determination is made under the KUTCD of the 
exact type of warning device to be installed at the crossing. 
Following the district court's certification under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(b) i this appeal was taken. 
We apply a de novo standard of review when considering a 
decision on summary judgment, Barnaon v. United States. 816 P.2d 
549/ 552 (10th Cir.), cert, don lad. 484 F.2d 896 (1987), and we 
use the sane standard applied in the district court. Osgood v. 
State Farm «ut. Auto Ins. Co.. 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). 
If no genuine issue of material fact exists, we determine if the 
'Section 434 states in partt 
The Congress declares that laws, rulesf 
regulations, orders, and standards relating to railroad 
safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent 
practicable. A State nav adopt or continue In force anv 
law, rule, regulation, order, or utandard relating to 
railroad tafetv until such time a« the Secretary fof 
Transportation) has adopted a rule, regulation, order. 
or standard covering the •ublact matter of much State 
requirement. A State may adopt or continue in forcean 
additional or more stringent law, rale, regulation, 
order, or standard relating to railroad safety when 
necessary to eliminate or re duo e an essentially local 
safety hasard, and when not incompatible with any 
Federal law, rule, regulation, order, or standard, and 
when not creating an undue burden on interstate 
commerce• 
45 U.8.C. $ 434 (emphasis added). 
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substantive law was correctly applied. Applied Genetics Int'l. 
T r«. v. Plrat Affiliated Sec, Inc., 912 P.2d 1238, 1241 <10th 
Cir. 1990). Because there are no disputed facts, the issue before 
us is ripe for summary determination. 
II. 
in 1970« with the adoption of FRSA, Congress required the 
Secretary of Transportation to study and develop solutions to 
problems associated with railroad grade crossings. 45 U.3.C. 
S 433(a) (1976). FRSA also directs the Secretary to address the 
grade crossing safety problem under his authority over highway 
traffic and safety. 45 U.S.C, § 433(b) (1976). Under the Highway 
Safety Act, 23 U.S.C *£ 401-404 (1982), the Secretary has the 
responsibility to develop uniform standards and to approve state-
designed highway safety programs as a condition precedent to the 
receipt by the state of federal highway funds. Through the 
Federal Highway Administration, the Secretary prescribed 
procedures to obtain uniformity in highway traffic control devices 
and adopted the HUTCD. 23 C.F.R. $ 655.601 (1981).3 
With this background, we begin our analysis by agreeing with 
the district court that S 434 of FRSA states an express preemption 
of state lew. We also agree preeaption does not occur until the 
Secretary adopts a rule, regulation, or standard covering the 
subject matter of the state law. Thus, we must determine whether 
any of the standards adopted by the Secretary cover the subject 
''Kansas has specifically adopted the MUTCD standards at 
Kan, Stat. Ann. $ 8-2003 and Kan. Adoin. Regs. 82-7-4(c) (1989). 
4-
matter of the duty to install active warning devices at railroad 
4 
crossings (rhere unusually dangerous conditions exist» 
III, 
While this court has not addressed the question, it has 
arisen in other courte with mixed results. In Marshall v. 
Arlington Worthern. Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1983), 
the oourt saids 
The (XUTCDJ prescribes that the selection of devices at 
grade crossing and the approval for federal funds is to 
be nade by local agencies with jurisdiction over the 
crossing. Thus, the Secretary has delegated federal 
authority to regulate grade crossings to local agencies. 
The locality in charge of the crossing in question. 
has nade no determination under the manual regarding the 
type of warning device to be Installed at the crossing. 
Until a federal decision is reached through the local 
agency on the adequacy of the warning devices at the 
crossing, the railroad's duty under applicable state law 
to maintain a "good and safe* crossing . . . is not 
preempted. 
Following Marshall, in Kixon v. Burlinoton Korthftfn a. ft.. NO. 
CV 8S-384-BLG-JF8, 1988 VL 215409 (D, Kont. Xay 2, 1988), the 
court found preemption because, prior to the incident in 
litigation, the State of Montana made an agreement with the 
^Courts have found the Secretary has acted upon other safety 
subjects. fiftf, e.g,, aurlinoton Northrn R.B. CO. v. Staf gj 
M2fi£j.« 880 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1989) (cabooses)> Burlino±on 
northern n.R. Cof v. State of Minn.. 882 ?.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(cabooses); Slak v. National R.R. P a w n e e * Corp.. J&A1—T-^SapAi 
g f f r ^ t f o * 'Hffl f_E—" *llJ1££>' CST *g«naa-- fe- v- ****** 
Ptl la. coiam'n o* OhlgT 901 F.2d 49? (6th Cir. 1990) (hesardous 
oateriala), cert, denied, HI 8* Ct. 781 (199i) | Morfolk a w..*»m 
Rv. Co. v. Fubllo Uti le . Conw'n of Qhift- 926 7.2d 567 (6th Cir. 
1991) (waUcwavsW but see SoutherlT Pee. Trannn. Co. v. Pnh^fl Utl l i . coasY'ii of Cal.. 820 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 198?) (traoX 
Clearance and walkways\» Missouri Pae. B.tt. v. ttallroad Common of 
5^',552 f:22*254 (5th c i r- 1988> <oa*oo«««)f ****- denied, 48$ 
U.S. 1009 (1989). 
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railroad to install flashing lijht signals with autonatic gates at 
the crossing whore the incident occurred* in Smith v. Norfolk t 
flea tern fty. Co.. 776 P. Supp. 1335 (H.D. Ind. 1991), the court 
applied forghall and granted partial aunwary judgment because 
prior to plaintiff's accident, the local agency determined tho 
necessary safety devices at the crossing and certified that the 
project was complete. In yderapn v. Chicago Cent. ft Pee. tt.q. 
ficjL* 771 P. Supp. 227 (H.O. 111. 1991), the court found the 
railroad failed to present evidence that the Illinois Commerce 
Commission made any determination under the MUTCD on the type of 
warning device to be installed at the crossing where the collision 
occurred. 
In Basterwood v. CSX Tranae., Inc.. 933 P.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 
1991), the court held preemption did not occur where a state, 
because of financial constraints, failed to implement a decision 
to install a particular signal device. Finally, in Southern Pag. 
Transp. Co. v. Ma a a Trucking Co.. 758 P. Supp. 608 (P. Nev, 1991), 
although citing Marshall, the court found no preemption where the 
Nevada Public Service Commission had issued a report recommending 
the crossing be upgraded with flashing lights and automatic gates, 
but, at the time of the accident, the improvements had not been 
made because the railroad claimed it had not received federal 
funds. 
IV. 
The dilemma presented by these varied results must be solved 
by resort to the language in the regulations adopted by the 
-6-
Secretary. First, all traffic control devices proposed for 
railroad crossings must comply with the uniform federal standards 
expressed in the KUTCO. 23 C.F.R. $ 646.214(b)(1).5 second, all 
states must adopt the KUTCO and its revisions in order to receive 
federal highway funding. 23 C.F.R. S 655.603(b)(1). Third, the 
HUTCD standards are "intended for use both in new installations 
and at locations where general replacement of present apparatus is 
made," KUTCO, 1 0A-2. 
Fourth, the MDTCD specifically states« 
With due regard for safety and fox the integrity of 
operations by highway and railroad users, the highway 
agency and the railroad company are entitled to jointly 
occupy the right-of-way in the conduct of their assigned 
duties. This requires joint responsibility in the 
traffic control function between the public agency and 
the railroad. The determination of need and selection 
of devices at a grade crossing is made by the public 
agency with jurisdictional authority. Subject to such 
determination and selection, the design, installation 
and operation shall be in accordance with the national 
Standards contained herein. 
KUTCO, Part v m , % 8A-1. This provision is partioulsrly 
Important for two reasons. One, it circumscribes the authority to 
determine what "devices" shall be ereoted at a grade crossing to 
"the public agency with jurisdictional authority.* Two, it also 
makes the "installation and operation" of such devices subject to 
the determination of that agency* Thus, until a determination of 
need is made, no new device can be Installed or operated at a 
crossing. 
This provision relates to "grade crossing improvements' and 
statest "All traffic control devices proposed shall conply with 
the latest edition of the Manual on Unffoxm Traffic Control 
D
*
vfCS84..foF Streets and Highways supplemented to the extent 
applicable by State standards." 
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V. 
Tha operation of 11 8A-1 and 2 results in a consequence which 
concerned tha district court. Assuming preemption occurred whan 
the MUTCD was adopted or when the Secretary promulgated 23 C.F.R. 
$ 646.200, the court reasoned that a significant delay could be 
encountered before a safety device would be installed* Tha court 
believed this "gap period" is inconsistent with "the recognized 
view that 'S 434 manifests an intent to avoid gaps in safety 
regulations•'" Hatfield. 757 T, Supp. at 1205* Moreover, the 
court found "no regulation promulgated by the 
Secretary . . . which would prohibit a railroad from voluntarily 
deciding to put in place an improved warning device . . . during 
the gap period." I£b. at 1206. Thus, tha court reasoned, the 
railroad has the authority (and assunably the duty) to install an 
improved warning device at a dangerous crossing during the "gap 
period*" We disagree. 
The district court's conclusion overlooks the specific 
language of XUTCD 1 80-1 which states i 
The selection of traffic control devices at a grade 
crossing is determined by public agencies having 
Jurisdictional responsibility at specific locations 
a e • e 
Due to tha large number of significant variables 
which must be considered there is no single standard 
system of active traffic control devices universally 
applicable for grade crossings. Based on an engineering 
and trafflo investigation, a determination is made 
whether any active) traffic control system is required at 
a crossing and, if so, what type is appropriate, pefora, 
A ASKas mfldifioi ojcadt s&aMiia trafUfi ca&zcl txtiaa 
Jtt lnPtaUfttii flpprOYfli 1ft EWUlged jrcjtf £h* appropriate 
ASBOSX aiilOx* A oixan fitatix 
-0 
(emphasis added). This regulation effectively prohibits a 
railroad from acting on ite ovm to select and install a safety 
device, contrary to the district court's conclusion. Moreover, it 
absolves the railroad of any Independent duty regarding grade 
crossing safety devices. 
VI. 
^ h e scheme of regulation is patent. Congress expressed an 
intent to invade the field of grade crossing safety devices, 
postponing that invasion only until the Secretary of 
Transportation adopted a rule, regulation, order, requirement, or 
standard relating to that field. The Secretary has responded by 
adopting the MUTCD and making it applicable to grade crossings. 
Recognising the variability of conditions that can arise at each 
intersection, the Secretary has delegated to local authority the 
responsibility of assessing the needs end establishing the design 
for safety devices. Nonetheless, the statutory aandate for the 
adoption of a standard that would supplement any state requirement 
for grade crossing safety devices Is satisfied by the adoption of 
the MUTCD. To that extent then, we disagree with MoXfiJlAll. 
Our disagreement with Marshall goes beyond our differing 
analysis of language in PR6A and MUTCD pertaining to preemption of 
common law standards of care for grade crossings, however. 
1 — 
"See also Kan. Stat. Ann. $ 8-1512 which statesi 
ia) No person shall place, maintain or display upon or n view of any highway any unauthorised sign, signal, 
narking or device which purports to be or is an 
imitation of or resembles an official . . . railroad 
sign or signal. 
#•£•» 
Continuing resort to common law standards after a state adopts 
KUTCD disrupts a basic purpose of FRSA as it is implemented by the 
provision of funding, namely, recognition of priorities, FRSA 
contemplates that some sites are more dangerous than others and 
that resources should first bo put to use on the mora dangerous 
ones, all in accordance with a rational scheme based on surveys. 
This is a prospective-looking system. Jury verdicts based on 
common law standards, which Are of a high degree of abstraction 
and generality, are ret respective-loo king and are addressed to 
only one crossing rather than a system of crossings* The hit-or-
miss common lav method runs counter to a statutory schema of 
planned prlorltisation. 
Having adopted the KUTCD, the Secretary prescribed tha 
standard required by 45 O.S.C. S 434, and any state law relating 
to grade crossing safety devices was then superseded. All $ 434 
requires for preemption to occur is the adoption of the standard, 
and the KUTCD contains the standard. Postponing the determination 
of what specific device is required for a given grade crossing is 
simply a matter of implementing that standard. The scheme enacted 
by Congress did not anticipate that the effeot of the standard was 
to be deferred or made selectively applicable for each grade 
crossing in the United States. To the contrary, once the 
Secretary adopted the standard, its superseding effect became 
uniform throughout the nation* 
He do not believe leaving responsibility for implementation 
of the standard to local authority diminishes this result. 
Requiring a local survey of grade crossing* to determine need and 
•10-
design la no wore than a pragmatic response to the multitude of 
conditions that exist throughout the country which dictate whether 
and what kind of a de/ice is required at a specific place. 
Nonetheless, with the adoption of the MOTCD, the Secretary has 
absolved railroads from complying with duties imposed by state law 
regarding safety devices at grade crossings. Without such a 
duty, a railroad cannot be liable in common law negligence for 
failure to provide adequate safety devices at a grade crossing. 
The judgment of the dlstrlot court is RXVBRSBD and RKMAHDBD 
with instructions to grant defendant's motion for summary partial 
judgment and for further proceedings on plaintiff's remaining 
claims* 
-11-
•••END*** 
